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Article
By the close of the 20th century, the dominant top-down 
expert-driven management of natural resources was deemed 
to have failed. A new, conceptually attractive participatory 
model replaced it, promising better decisions and more sus-
tainable outcomes. The participatory paradigm appeals to all 
political persuasions: left-wing radicals looking for grass-
roots empowerment, and right-wing neoliberals for ways of 
circumventing perceived ineffectual central governments 
(Mohan & Stokke, 2000). Ultimately, participation “means 
different things to different people” (Eversole, 2003, p. 782).
There are examples of successful participation in the lit-
erature (Abernethy & Sally, 2000; Chambers, 1997; Cook 
et al., 2013; D. A. Crook & Jones, 1999; Ostrom, 2005). 
However, they tend to operate at the local scale, with clearly 
defined and manageable goals—often with a focus on envi-
ronmental protection or managing an irrigation scheme, and 
where the stakeholders are relatively homogeneous in terms 
of power relations and levels of education. They are also 
often in areas with resource abundance, for example, plenty 
of water (Cook et al., 2013). Thus, any lessons learnt may not 
be transferable to other contexts.
Despite this, participation was embraced with precipitate 
haste, scaled up and embedded into many developing coun-
tries’ national policies with massive transformatory and 
environmental protection expectations (Holmes & Scoones, 
2000). One of the most ambitious applications was in newly 
democratic South Africa, with its challenging history, 
extreme heterogeneity, and relative water scarcity (Muller, 
2009). There is scant evidence, however, that the participa-
tory paradigm will deliver the ambitious goals of many het-
erogeneous developing countries in reasonable time frames, 
and they may not be transferable to contexts of scarcity.
The participatory model was embraced very much as an 
act of faith and “in opposition to previously dominant mod-
els of development” (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p. 4). There is 
therefore a strong case to be made for evaluating participa-
tory approaches, and what has been achieved vis-à-vis top-
down non-participatory models, especially in view of the 
expenditure and expectation vested in it. The World Bank 
only acknowledged in 2005 a severe lack of research that 
evaluated its participatory programs (25% of its total portfo-
lio; World Bank, 2005).
Conley and Moote (2003) suggest that evaluations of the 
right sort are urgently needed, but those that have been under-
taken are largely unsatisfactory for a number of reasons: There 
are those produced by enthusiasts of participation (Beierle & 
Cayford, 2002; Innes & Booher, 1999), or conversely, by crit-
ics of the approach (Coglianese, 1999; Cooke & Kothari, 
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2001) to justify their position. The frameworks that these aca-
demics have used for their evaluations, and their measures of 
success, are radically different. There is not a uniformly agreed 
framework for undertaking evaluations, and moreover, evalu-
ations may not be objective (Robson, 2002).
What is needed is a balanced and rigorous type of evalua-
tion, useful across different scales and contexts and empiri-
cally grounded. To date, there is a dearth of evaluations that 
assess what can and cannot be expected from participatory 
approaches (Conley & Moote, 2003; Hickey & Mohan, 
2004; Rowe & Frewer, 2000).
This article first proceeds with a review of the relevant 
literature on evaluations and then offers a framework devised 
for evaluating participatory initiatives. A series of four 
vignettes from the Inkomati region of north east South Africa 
are set out and assessed against the evaluative framework. 
Lessons learnt about the nature of participation and attempts 
to evaluate it conclude the article.
A Framework for Evaluating 
Participatory Processes and Outcomes
The purpose of an evaluation is to show whether a new initia-
tive is working toward the stated goals of the program 
(Robson, 2002). Clarity over the objective is crucial: Without 
it, measuring success is compromised. Baseline data must be 
collected to gauge whether a program is having an impact; 
this is often something that has been neglected with the roll-
ing out of participatory efforts (World Bank, 2005).
Of huge significance is the context in which a particular 
initiative is being undertaken: the scale, availability of the 
resource, economic status, and heterogeneity of stakeholders 
(Bellamy, McDonald, Syme, & Butterworth, 1999). Context 
is inextricably linked to the goals of many initiatives, for in 
the literature it is clear that in developed countries, the 
emphasis of participatory efforts in natural resource manage-
ment tends to be conflict resolution and environmental pro-
tection (Cook et al., 2013), whereas in developing countries, 
social, economic, and environmental sustainability are 
sought, a far more ambitious undertaking (Muller, 2009). 
There are also important differences in the level of citizen 
control being advocated in developed and developing coun-
tries: In the former, it tends to be collaborative management, 
in the latter, participation is often coupled with devolution 
(the highest level of Arnstein, 1969 ladder). It is rarely, in 
evaluating participatory programs in developed and develop-
ing contexts, that like can be compared with like.
It is the business of evaluators to look at both the pro-
cesses in setting up a participatory program and the outcomes 
that are the result. Processes need to be considered fair, open, 
inclusive, and accountable to engender support for the deci-
sions and potential products and outcomes that stem from 
them (Parkins & Mitchell, 2005). It is also crucial that they 
are linked to real decision making and substantive changes 
on the ground, that is, sustainable development outcomes. 
Otherwise, interest in participatory processes may be lost, 
and they may be seen as a mere “talking shop” (Tewdwr-
Jones & Allmendinger, 1998, p. 183). A major problem has 
been that evaluators tend to focus on either processes or out-
comes, with a particular bias to the former (Conley & Moote, 
2003). To understand this, it is necessary to look at the moti-
vations for undertaking an evaluation and the perspective of 
evaluators. Deliberative democrats, heavily influenced by 
the Habermasian (1984) ideal speech, view participation and 
deliberative processes as an end in itself (Healey, 2003; 
Innes, 1996). This is largely at variance with the natural 
resource management literature (Bellamy, Walker, 
McDonald, & Syme, 2001; Blaikie, 2006). There has also 
been a trend for participatory evaluations, that is, asking par-
ticipants what they thought of the process, often favored by 
those who value processes and deliberation (Carr & 
Halvorsen, 2001; Charnley & Engelbert, 2005). A second 
explanation is that focusing on processes is easier than out-
comes: The indicators (discussed shortly) are relatively 
straightforward to assess, often more practical and certainly 
less tortuous. However, it is unsatisfactory to give undue 
weight to processes only—because it ignores whether 
improvements in livelihoods or the environment are being 
delivered. Focusing on outcomes only could mean that pro-
cesses become a “black box” (Robson, 2002, p. 209)—study-
ing the intervening processes may determine the variables 
that have affected the outcome and their causal links. There 
is therefore a strong case for an evaluative methodology that 
looks at both processes and outcomes of participatory initia-
tives: a “daunting task that is rarely undertaken” (Conley & 
Moote, 2003, p. 374).
Before moving on to the proposed process and outcomes 
evaluative framework, which in the second half of the article 
is applied to four participatory initiatives in South Africa, it is 
helpful to differentiate between processes, products of pro-
cesses (interchangeable with outputs), and overall outcomes 
because these distinctions are not always clear in the literature. 
Figure 1 illustrates the stages based on South Africa’s plans to 
establish participatory Catchment Management Agencies 
(CMA) charged with the planning and management of water 
resources. Some clarification is required in the process and 
product category where the interpretation of success or failure 
may be challenged. An output may be “tangible,” such as a 
new representative institution (a CMA) or an agreement, or it 
may be “intangible,” such as enhanced social and intellectual 
capital and increased trust that may be difficult to measure 
(Bellamy et al., 2001; Charnley & Englebert, 2005). The tan-
gible category conventionally is regarded as a success, but as 
Innes and Booher (1999), deliberative democrats, put it, 
“Conventional ideas . . . may lead one to see failure where 
there is success and vice versa” (p. 415). An agreement may 
lack durability, so is ultimately a failure; on the other hand, in 
the context of South Africa’s history, processes that work on 
capacity building may prove to be important to the long-term 
success and durability of participatory efforts. In sum, a lack 
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of tangible products should not necessarily be viewed as fail-
ure. Another area of blurring of framework categories, again 
stemming from different academic backgrounds and perspec-
tives, is where intangible process outputs and social sustain-
ability outcomes become indistinguishable. Innes and Booher 
and Mog (2004) would categorize the former as social sustain-
ability outcomes, whereas this author would argue that social 
sustainability is a reduction in inequalities. Thus, even decid-
ing on what is a process and what is an outcome is not straight-
forward. It is argued that outcomes should be sub-divided into 
mid-term outcome—participatory governance—and the ulti-
mate outcome—which is the result of this governance—sus-
tainable management of the resource.
It is generally agreed that evaluative criteria—indicators 
against which to measure progress in an initiative—are of 
crucial importance (Conley & Moote, 2003; Fraser, Dougill, 
Mabee, Reed, & McAlpine, 2006; Robson, 2002). There is a 
vast and confusing body of literature that warns that too 
many indicators can become unwieldy (Bell & Morse, 2003; 
Kenny, 1999). All indicator lists are normative, but not all 
indicators themselves are subjective: for example, the num-
ber of members in an organization. Furthermore, what is 
deemed a success or failure is a value judgment and therefore 
subjective: thus, “developing truly objective means of evalu-
ating collaborative efforts is impossible” (Conley & Moote, 
2003, p. 382). Thus, it is important that evaluators declare 
their position and potential bias.
Process Evaluation
Three broad categories of process indicators are identified in 
Table 1. The first category of indicators is “acceptance 
criteria,” and is linked to the legitimacy and trust in the process 
(Lind & Tyler, 1988; Rowe & Frewer, 2000). The second cat-
egory, “process criteria,” is related to more practical consider-
ations. The final category of indicator is products: Did the 
process result in desired “tangible” and “intangible” products? 
These process indicators are fully explored and they are 
applied to the case studies presented in the fourth part of the 
article.
Participatory Governance Outcome Evaluation
This is a category that the literature tends to overlook but it 
is important and discrete, and proposed indicators are pre-
sented in Table 2.
Sustainable Development Outcome Evaluation
What is the evidence that participatory and devolutionary 
processes have resulted in sustainable outcomes? There are 
no universally agreed on set of sustainability indicators, and 
although indicators have been developed (Fraser et al., 2006; 
Mog, 2004), they are for a specific purpose and context, fre-
quently weighted toward environmental sustainability and 
are not applicable for the present study. This takes us back to 
the original three pillars of sustainability: economic, envi-
ronmental, and social (Baker, 2006). Within each aspect, a 
choice of indicators is needed. Economic indicators could 
include a growing economy and gross domestic product 
(GDP) that is relatively straightforward to assess. Potential 
environmental sustainability indicators would include the 
maintenance and enhancement of ecological integrity, which 
would require adequate technical capacity to determine and 
Processes  Products
Tangible 
Mid-term goal Ultimate Goal
Acceptance Criteria - New representative 
institutions e.g CMA Participatory Governance Sustainable management of 
South Africa's water
Intangible resources
e.g
Practical Considerations - Increased trust
- Enhanced social and
intellectual capital
Process and Outcome-orientated evaluation
Outcomes
Process-orientated evaluation
Figure 1. Evaluative framework differentiating between processes, products, and outcomes.
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Table 1. Process Indicators.
Process category Indicators Sources
Acceptance criteria Early involvement Middendorf and Busch (1997); Rowe and Frewer (2000)
 Representative and inclusive Conley and Moote (2003); Rowe and Frewer (2000); Smith and 
McDonough (2001); Mog (2004); Leventhal, Karuzu, and Fry (1980); 
Holmes and Scoones (2000); Cornwall (2004)
 Continuity in attendance Leventhal et al. (1980); Rowe and Frewer (2000)
 Able to voice opinions in a safe 
environment (participants listen to 
others and show respect)
Webler and Tuler (2000); Smith and McDonough (2001); Thibaut and 
Walker (1975); Leventhal et al. (1980); Lind and Tyler (1988); Habermas 
(1984); Mog (2004)
 Influence on decision making Rowe and Frewer (2000); Dryzek (1990); Smith and McDonough (2001); 
Leventhal et al. (1980); Thibaut and Walker (1975); Habermas (1984); 
Mog (2004); Hampton (1999); Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998); 
Holmes and Scoones (2000)
 Transparency, neutrality, and 
independence
Lind and Tyler (1988); Conley and Moote (2003); Rowe and Frewer 
(2000); Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson (2006); Baggett, Jeffrey, and Jefferson 
(2006)
 Accountable (feedback) Ribot et al. (2006); Rowe and Frewer (2000)
Process criteria Accessible data and information Mog (2004); Rowe and Frewer (2000); Glicken (2000); Leventhal  
et al. (1980); Habermas (1984); Webler (1995); Renn, Webler, and 
Wiedemann (1995); Webler and Tuler (2000); Forsyth (2003); Adams 
(1992)
 Human resources Singleton (2002); Rowe and Frewer (2000); Lachapelle, McCool, and 
Patterson (2003)
 Material resources Rowe and Frewer (2000); Singleton (2002); Lachapelle et al. (2003)
 Adequate time Rowe and Frewer (2000); Singleton (2002)
 Clear task, definition, and plan Rowe and Frewer (2000)
Evidence of products Tangible products Blaikie (2006)
Intangible products Innes (1996); Healey (2003); Mog (2004)
Table 2. Participatory Governance Outcome Indicators.
Participatory governance indicator Considerations Sources
Representatives are active in discussions 
and make substantive and meaningful 
contributions
Necessitates a level of understanding 
and capacity
Habermas (1984); Cornwall (2004); Holmes 
and Scoones (2000)
Through discussion and negotiation, 
representatives are able to come to 
decisions over the planning and managing of 
resources
It is recognized that discussions will 
oscillate between conflict and 
consensus, but there is a need to 
reach a level of agreement
World Bank (2005)
The new representative organizations have the 
power to implement changes, and changes 
are made
Ribot et al. (2006); Habermas (1984); Rowe 
and Frewer (2000); Dryzek (1990); Smith 
and McDonough (2001); Leventhal et al. 
(1980); Thibaut and Walker (1975); Mog 
(2004); Hampton (1999); Tewdwr-Jones 
and Allmendinger (1998); Holmes and 
Scoones (2000)
Accountable Ribot et al. (2006); Batterbury and Fernando 
(2006); Agrawal and Ribot (1999); R. C. 
Crook and Manor (1998)
measure. Social sustainability may be the most subjective 
criterion: This researcher argues strongly that redress and 
reduction in inequalities are important indicators, particu-
larly given South Africa’s history of White minority rule. As 
Conley and Moote (2003) point out, documenting “outcomes 
is easiest when they are readily quantified, and where there is 
sufficient baseline information to allow reliable compari-
sons” (p. 379), which goes some way to justify Mog’s (2004) 
assessment of sustainability evaluations as being an “intel-
lectual quagmire.”
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Participatory Initiatives in South Africa: 
Four Vignettes
Democratic South Africa is regarded as being at the forefront 
of enshrining participation into laws and policies. For exam-
ple, its 1998 National Water Act aims to radically transform 
the management of water through the establishment of par-
ticipatory CMAs and at the sub-catchment scale through the 
transformation of White-dominated irrigation boards into 
more inclusive Water User Associations (WUA; Republic of 
South Africa, 1998). Participation of stakeholders is also 
now a legal requirement for all industrial proposals that 
require Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) following 
the 1997 Environment Conservation Act (Republic of South 
Africa, 1997).
There now follow four vignettes of participatory initia-
tives drawn from the Inkomati Water Management Area: The 
first is the establishment of South Africa’s first CMA, the 
second looks at attempts to establish WUAs in the Inkomati, 
the third explores the creation of the deliberative Crocodile 
Forum, and the final vignette investigates public participa-
tion in the EIA for Sappi Kraft paper mill’s proposed expan-
sion plans. The case studies exist at different scales: some are 
legal requirements, others are voluntary initiatives; they 
encompass different levels of heterogeneity of stakeholders, 
and they were each established for different purposes.
The water-stressed Inkomati (deficit of 12% of total 
requirement) constitutes three catchments, from north to 
south: Sabie/Sand, Crocodile, and the Komati, and includes 
portions of three different former Black homelands (see 
Figure 2). Covering an area of 28,383 km2 with an estimated 
population of 1.4 million in 1995, the dominant users are still 
White-controlled commercial agriculture (57% total require-
ment), followed by commercial forestry and industry 
(Department of Water Affairs [DWA], 2004).
Method
Much of the data for the case studies come from primary 
interview material generated from three visits to South Africa 
between November 2003 and March 2005. One hundred and 
one interviews were conducted with the main stakeholder 
groups both in the Inkomati and Pretoria, not all of whom 
were participants in the participatory processes. Interviewees 
were asked questions about their awareness of participatory 
initiatives, their involvement in these initiatives (if at all), 
and reflections on the processes. Meetings of the Crocodile 
Forum and CMA Advisory Committee were observed. 
Government reports and other studies were also consulted.
At this stage, it is important to declare that this 
researcher has a tendency to weight outcomes over pro-
cesses: Are participatory efforts resulting in real changes 
on the ground, most notably in terms of redress for the 
rural Black population?
Vignette 1: Inkomati CMA
A zealous Mpumalanga regional DWA official initiated par-
ticipatory efforts in July 1997 to develop CMA proposals in 
what is now the Inkomati Water Management Area prior to 
the finalization of the 1998 Act and before the Water 
Management Areas were determined—in 1999, by govern-
ment-appointed consultants. There was difficulty in identify-
ing and engaging Black interests, not traditionally organized 
around water, but eventually Black representatives joined 
already established steering committees. Meetings were held 
in English. There was a lack of continuity in attendance, and 
poor relaying of information to their communities was an 
obstacle throughout. A single Inkomati Reference Group 
emerged from the committees, whose final proposal for a 
CMA Governing Board, submitted in October 2000, was 
along geographical rather than sectoral lines, the result of 
exhaustive participatory endeavors. Lack of transparent 
water use figures by the agricultural sector hindered proceed-
ings and clouded the implications of the proposal. In effect, 
the Governing Board could have been dominated by existing 
users, and DWA Pretoria officials recognized this. The pro-
posal was put aside for 18 months pending efforts to garner 
stakeholder feedback. A period of inactivity followed during 
which the forums disintegrated and the regional champion 
relocated. This was also a period of growing tensions between 
DWA Pretoria and DWA Mpumalanga who did not maintain 
the forums, despite pressure from DWA Pretoria.
Fresh impetus came from impending elections in 2004 
before which the Minister wanted one CMA in place, and 
this resulted in a rushed public relations (PR) exercise. In 
line with the Act, he appointed a committee to advice on the 
structure of the CMA Governing Board. Observation of an 
Advisory Committee meeting (March 2004) in a high-end 
hotel in Nelspruit emphasized knowledge asymmetries 
between Black and White attendees, and it was apparent that 
the DWA-hired facilitator was actually leading the commit-
tee to pre-determined recommendations. The original 2000 
proposal was discarded and sectoral representation adopted, 
with a heavy slant toward Black interests. There were issues 
of participant continuity—some Black representatives were 
replaced in the afternoon session, and the late arrival of two 
highly vocal and educated White female NGO representa-
tives caused some disruption (although they were supportive 
of the facilitator’s position). The Black nominal Chairman of 
the Advisory Committee conceded in March 2005 that he felt 
“uncomfortable” and “lost” during the process. At a later 
meeting, a 14-seat Governing Board was recommended, in 
effect sidelining commercial farmers, the single largest water 
user, and only granting forestry its own seat after lobbying 
the Minister. Unsurprisingly, commercial farmers were 
unhappy at the outcome and in protest were withholding pay-
ment on the Water Resource Management Charge on which 
the functioning on the CMA was to rest.
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The formal launch of the CMA was in March 2004, to 
coincide with Water Week, but difficulty finding nominees 
for Historically Disadvantaged Groups held up proceedings 
until September 2005. Nominations were put up for each seat 
and the DWA Minister made the final choice of members. The 
differential education, skills, and experience of the Governing 
Board members was highlighted by Brown (2011).
The Governing Board of the CMA is only “nominally 
functional” (Merrey, 2011, p. 253), and this is one of the 
most advanced in South Africa. It is now focusing its efforts 
on a Catchment Management Strategy (Quinn, 2012). There 
was high turnover of Governing Board members, and the 
CEO position remained vacant for some time. The decision 
to designate the Inkomati as an area for Compulsory 
Licensing effectively removes the power to reallocate water 
away from the CMA to the center, thus stifling the potential 
to achieve redress through a devolved and participatory 
institution.
Following a review by DWA (2012) to reduce the number 
of Water Management Areas, and thus potential CMAs, from 
19 to 9, DWA plans to enlarge the Inkomati to incorporate 
the adjacent the Mlhatuze-Usuthu Water Management Area. 
This may compromise the future manageability of the CMA 
in the interests of supposed efficiency.
Vignette 2: The Transformation of Irrigation 
Boards Into WUA
The irrigation boards in the Inkomati, developed by the 
White commercial farming sector in former White-only 
Figure 2. Map of Inkomati water management area, South Africa.
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South Africa, are an example of sustainable participatory 
institutions managing water at the sub-catchment scale, 
although they were not racially representative. Members are 
homogeneous with a shared vision of managing the river, 
dam, or canal to their benefit. They also enjoyed a high level 
of autonomy, particularly in the lower Komati subcatchment, 
designated a Government Water Control Area, making mem-
bership of irrigation boards mandatory for all irrigators. The 
membership composition of the Komati and Lomati irriga-
tion boards was by the mid-1990s unique because the 
Government Water Control Area was expanded to include 
Black small-scale farmers in the former homeland areas. 
These were the recipients of a sugarcane development pro-
gram and were incorporated into the existing irrigation 
boards. Discussions with Komati irrigation board Black rep-
resentatives in February 2004, whose travel expenses were 
paid for, suggested that they do not participate in discussions 
and were merely passive listeners. The attendance of Black 
representatives was thus not necessarily out of interest and 
could only be guaranteed if their expenses were paid.
The 1998 Act stipulated that all irrigation boards were to 
transform into more inclusive and representative WUAs 
within 6 months. The transformation proposals of all 27 irri-
gation boards were rejected by DWA on the grounds that 
they were not satisfied that the processes had been inclusive 
and participatory. Even the racially representative Komati 
and Lomati irrigation boards had their proposals rejected 
because they failed to incorporate non-farming interests. 
Local municipal representatives felt the proposal they were 
presented with a fait accompli, and they felt that they were 
given minimal time to consider it.
By 2005, only two WUAs had been established—one 
was the transformation of the Elands Valley irrigation 
board, and this was only on the fourth attempt in March 
2005, after the Elands Valley irrigation board chairman 
(retired farmer) had invested considerable time and effort 
in consultation and ensured the proposal met the increas-
ingly strict representation criteria for race and gender 
set by DWA. The other WUA (Upper Komati, north of 
Sawziland) was established in October 2004, in an area 
that never had irrigation boards. This was therefore a new 
institution. As with the Elands Valley irrigation board, its 
formation was the result of personal efforts by a retired 
and reform-orientated former White councilor. Again, he 
reported the frustration of meeting DWA representation 
criteria: “The goals kept shifting.” After 1,400 hours, and 
20,000 km of travel out of his own finances, he was able 
to demonstrate to DWA a representative WUA committee. 
Establishing a WUA was no guarantee that it would func-
tion, and regional DWA officials reported in March 2005 
that the fledgling Upper Komati WUA was already 
“struggling.”
Unhappy with their treatment and what they saw as unre-
alistic expectations of DWA for the composition of WUAs, 
many irrigation boards had drawn back from transforming, 
resulting in a standoff with DWA.
Vignette 3: Crocodile Catchment Forum
The Crocodile Forum constitutes an attempt to establish a 
multi-sectoral deliberative forum to promote collaborative 
management of the lower Crocodile catchment. This is the 
sort of endeavor encouraged by DWA Pretoria and it is in line 
with those who believed that forums developed to address 
locally important issues are likely to be more durable than 
those formed for a specific task whose raison d’être disap-
pears when the project is completed.
Low levels of water entering the Kruger National Park 
(KNP) were adversely affecting wildlife in this ecologically 
important area, and relations between the KNP and commer-
cial farmers, the main water user, had soured on ecological 
grounds over the halting of a proposed barrage across the 
river by the KNP. A new KNP Water Manager was appointed 
in September 2003, a Ghanaian PhD with participatory expe-
rience in another South African catchment. He took steps to 
reconcile opposing sides concerning the barrage and suc-
ceeded in easing long-standing tensions. Building on this 
progress, he took the initiative to establish a forum uniting 
local stakeholders: Transvaal Suiker Beperk (TSB) sugar 
miller and White commercial sugar farmers, tourist represen-
tatives, municipal officials, elected Black councilors, and 
tribal authorities (representing the rural Black population) 
were to discuss water management issues. These efforts were 
supported but not led by DWA regional officials (interviewed 
February 2005) who thought it a “good thing” that the initia-
tive came from an affected party (KNP), giving it more legit-
imacy and credibility: “it is a people’s forum.”
The KNP Water Manager’s time and personal effort gal-
vanized support, and the inaugural meeting in a high-end 
lodge on the February 3, 2004, saw good attendance but was 
unrepresentative racially, to the extent that a Representivity 
Task Group was set up to investigate the racial skews. A 
February 2005 meeting was attended by this researcher, at a 
four star resort, with 35 to 40 attendees, but no Black repre-
sentatives were present due to local animosities between 
elected councilors and tribal authorities. It seemed that the 
farming and sugar sectors were present to keep abreast of 
water reforms, elicit information about the CMA process, 
and voice concerns in general.
The local private water company (Greater Nelspruit 
Utility Company [GNUC]) supported the initiative for a 
year, but by 2005 indicated it was a waste of time because “it 
has no teeth,” that is, it has no regulatory powers. It was clear 
that without the leadership of the KNP Water Manager, the 
forum would struggle. His efforts have been recognized as he 
was, in March 2013, appointed the Inkomati CMA CEO.
Vignette 4: Sappi Kraft Paper Mill, Ngodwana—
Proposed Expansion and the Environmental 
Response
Two participatory initiatives can be identified in this case 
study: first, the Sappi Forest Liaison Forum that was 
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established in 2000 and second, participation in the EIA, 
required by law (Republic of South Africa, 1997), concern-
ing Sappi Kraft’s proposed expansion to its Ngodwana mill. 
The Sappi group—Sappi Forest is the supplier of raw materi-
als for the mill’s operations—is a multi-national company 
and an important source of local employment.
The concerns of stakeholders now have to be factored into 
decision making, and the perceptions of local groups have 
assumed a much more important role. Under the 1997 Act, a 
full EIA can be avoided if the delegated authority—in this 
case, the provincial government’s Environment Department, 
to whom decision-making power has been entrusted—is sat-
isfied that “sufficient information” was presented during the 
Scoping Phase of the EIA. This is what Sappi Kraft hoped 
for (Golder and Associates, 2003).
To this end, Sappi set up the Forestry Liaison Forum to try 
to dispel misconceptions about its environmental record and 
about the stream reduction impact of eucalyptus. Behind all 
this was the desire to pave the way for the impending EIA. 
This “public relations exercise,” as it was perceived by com-
mitted local environmentalists (interviewed March 2005), 
was instrumental in bringing together aggrieved, highly 
vocal “nature-loving” individuals and local conservancy 
groups and national NGOs—Geasphere, Environmental 
Action Link, and Wildlife and Environment Society of South 
Africa. An alliance was thus formed with professional envi-
ronmental scientists who provided strong technical under-
standing and discredited Sappi’s environmental record. 
Nobel and Spoor of Nelspruit and the Legal Resources 
Centre, Pretoria, provided legal expertise.
The areas of discontent broadened from specific issues 
such as irrigating adjacent fields with chlorinated effluent 
from the mills’ activities and river and air contamination, to 
a more fundamental conflict over land use being played out 
over the extensive and growing use of alien plantation spe-
cies (Golder and Associates, 2003). The well-organized, 
technically aware, and legally astute environmental lobby 
used the EIA process to convince the delegated authority 
(regional Environment Department) to demand a full EIA, 
which had considerable time and cost implications for Sappi 
(Golder and Associates, 2006a, 2006b). This can be seen as a 
victory for voluntary environmental groups over powerful 
industrial interests.
Central Government concern over the implications for the 
economy, however, led to new EIA regulations (announced 
in April 2005 by the National Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism) and criticism of current public partici-
pation processes as lacking “proper guidance and often 
abused.” Compulsory time frames aimed to speed up the pro-
cesses, reduce costs, and “facilitate out Accelerated and 
Shared Growth Initiative,” indicating that economic growth 
may take precedence over environmental concerns. This 
proved to be the case. The final decision in favor of the 
expansion was granted on February 22, 2008.
Application of the Evaluative 
Framework
This section now looks to evaluate the identified initiatives 
against indicators set out previously, as summarized in 
Figure 3.
Process-Orientated Evaluation
Acceptance criteria. Indicators under acceptance criteria 
(refer to Table 1) have to do with procedural trust (Webler, 
1995) and are by their nature subjective.
Early involvement. The consensus is participants should be 
involved early on and in the creation of options—otherwise, 
they may be viewed as rubber stamping exercises and a form 
of manipulation in Arnstein’s (1969) ladder (Middendorf 
& Busch, 1997). This criterion is actually quite subjective: 
For example, participation can start too early, that is, before 
clarification over the scope of the initiative (Chakraborty & 
Stratton, 1993).
Figure 3. Summary of evaluative framework and South African vignettes.
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In the CMA case study, involvement was begun before the 
1998 Act was passed or the boundaries of the Water 
Management Areas clarified: Participants initially assumed, 
mistakenly, that there would be three separate CMAs, one for 
each of the catchments. Overall, the CMA proposal process 
failed to engage representatives of all groups together at an 
early stage—which affects feelings of ownership and legiti-
macy. Black representation was an issue from the outset and 
it was found to be necessary to convene special homeland 
meetings in local languages before Black representatives 
could join already formed steering committees 6 months late. 
Already disadvantaged, they would feel handicapped vis-à-
vis longer standing members. Late involvement does not 
automatically disadvantage: At the CMA Advisory 
Committee meeting, the White NGO latecomers were actu-
ally able to shape the direction of proceedings along with the 
facilitator.
All 27 Inkomati irrigation boards had their WUA propos-
als rejected on the grounds of inclusiveness. This meant wid-
ening their coverage that necessitated bringing in people at a 
later stage. Municipal representatives, for example, felt they 
were presented with a fait accompli so they were reluctant to 
engage.
In the case of the Crocodile Forum, extensive personal 
engagement with a range of stakeholders, including tribal 
authorities and Black councilors, still did not result in atten-
dance and thus involvement of any kind. Invitations do not 
guarantee attendance: Local animosities, travel expenses, 
and intimidating venues are all factors that determine whether 
or not an invited person will in fact attend. With the Sappi 
Forest Forum, early engagement happened without recourse 
to special measures, as did the later EIA process.
Representative and inclusive. There are differences between 
deliberative democrats who emphasize “inclusiveness,” that 
is, everyone involved, and the natural resource management 
literature that stresses “representation” of users (Blaikie, 
2006). Because everyone is a user of water, and given the 
scale of the Inkomati, representation was a practical solution 
to the CMA proposal process. However, in view of South 
Africa’s recent history, if significant groups are excluded, 
then the legitimacy of such a process is threatened.
In the CMA proposal process, as noted, Black representa-
tion was a problem and the DWA local champion encoun-
tered great difficulty in identifying and engaging groups 
outside recognizable organizations (easily contactable). 
Early involvement of all sectors was a challenge. An inter-
pretation of DWA’s sidelining of the 2000 CMA proposal 
was that there could have been an Inkomati Governing Board 
that reinforced the dominance of existing users and was 
unrepresentative of the wider population.
The CMA Advisory Committee was inclusive and repre-
sentative, both in terms of race and gender, but was engi-
neered by DWA Pretoria. Black representation in the CMA 
process overall may have been greater than appeared because 
White NGOs and reform-orientated DWA officials upheld 
their interests. Without such intervention and representation, 
the interest of a large and poor rural population could be ren-
dered silent. However, in the long term, it may perpetuate 
Black dependency.
The irrigation boards, failing representivity criteria of 
DWA for WUAs, had their proposals rejected and were asked 
to enlarge their area of remit to incorporate non-agricultural 
users. Consulted irrigation board representatives (six) felt the 
shared vision of their current members (for example, to man-
age a canal) that made them sustainable would become lost 
as a result, hence, the reluctance of many irrigation boards to 
engage with the process following their initial rejection by 
DWA. It took the Elands Valley irrigation board 7 years to 
finally achieve the level of representation that satisfied 
DWA. It is noteworthy that in the Komati and Lomati irriga-
tion boards, the White commercial farmers represented 
themselves individually (about 80 on the Komati irrigation 
board) whereas the Black farmers sent irrigation scheme rep-
resentatives and thus appeared a small presence at meetings, 
although in fact they outnumbered the commercial farmers 5 
to 1. It has been suggested that Black representatives tended 
to be the elderly rather than the most dynamic, a reflection of 
a largely patriarchal system.
On the Crocodile Forum, despite the exertions of the KNP 
Water Manager, attendance was not racially representative 
but it would most likely increase with successful land claims 
in the area, as irrigated agriculture was at that time not prac-
ticed by the Black population in the lower Crocodile.
The Forestry Forum was open to the public, but the Sappi 
Environmental Manager thought the meetings were domi-
nated by a “vocal minority” not representative of the wider 
Inkomati population. Similarly, the EIA Scoping Report 
exercise was disproportionately influenced by environmen-
talists. Evolving decision making to the local level and 
encouraging local representation may, as in this instance, 
give greater “voice” to minority positions.
Continuity in attendance. Ideally, the same representatives 
should attend meetings to maximize the process, sustain 
dialogue (Leventhal, Karuzu, & Fry, 1980), and avoid time-
wasting recaps. Lack of continuity by Black representatives 
was an issue in the CMA proposal process, and observations 
of the CMA Advisory Committee illustrated how disruptive 
and patchy attendance proved to be with different attendees 
in the morning and afternoon. This erratic attendance affects 
the quality of later feedback and accountability.
With the Crocodile Forum, there was less onus to attend 
when the purpose was not decision making but learning and 
improved relations. Interest was beginning to wane among 
some attendees, which also may affect later continuity. The 
White commercial farmers, in a potentially tenuous position 
in new South Africa, felt the need to keep abreast of develop-
ments that may affect them, and thus regularly attended. 
Participation involves people’s time, and loss of earnings and 
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travel expenses may affect willingness to attend. Paid offi-
cials are in a different position altogether, and for the rela-
tively wealthy farmers, meetings may represent a social 
event.
Able to voice opinions in a safe environment. Although legit-
imacy for a process may be increased by the assurance of a 
respectful hearing (Smith & McDonough, 2001; Webler & 
Tuler, 2000), ground rules to prevent offensive statements or 
behavior can have a negative/tyrannical aspect (Kelly, 2004). 
The construction of a safe environment can hinder open and 
honest discussion, and multi-racial encounters may have a 
falseness about them, with a suppression of private views by 
both Black and White speakers, thus inadvertently frustrat-
ing a process of real change. The Komati irrigation board 
chairman (February 2004) made it clear that anyone could 
contribute to meetings, but those “seeking to derail processes 
would be excluded.”
People can be made uncomfortable by the choice of 
venue: High-end tourist lodges and hotels were used by the 
CMA Advisory Committee and Crocodile Forum meetings. 
Participants can be deterred from voicing opinions in larger 
meetings, the lingua franca (English) is often no one’s first 
language, and the very technical topics under discussion can 
overawe attendees. In the early stages of the CMA process, 
the DWA champion held meetings in local languages in the 
former homeland areas to encourage willingness to talk. 
Black attendees felt less comfortable on joining the larger 
“invited” CMA spaces. In the Sappi EIA Scoping Report, 
written submissions were encouraged, and this practice 
favors the highly educated. Clearly, voice is relational to 
place and context.
Influence on decision making. It is recognized that legiti-
macy is lessened for participatory processes not linked more 
directly to policy making, and participants can be made to 
feel they were used to give an appearance of participation 
if they do not contribute to decision making: “tokenism” in 
Arnstein’s (1969) ladder. Even Dryzek (1990), a deliberative 
democrat, recognizes that there has to be a link to decisions—
without which they risk being labeled “talking shops.”
The White commercial farming sector took an active part 
in the CMA process and had some say in the 2000 proposal, 
although they felt “bulldozed” by the CMA champion, and 
were not totally happy with it. However, they had no impact in 
the direction the Advisory Committee followed nor in how it 
was set up. This was engineered and manipulated with a DWA 
appointed facilitator in control. It is suggested that DWA inter-
vened to make the process more legitimate in the eyes of mar-
ginal groups, fearing that the commercial farmers had 
altogether too much influence at the local level. In view of the 
outcome of the CMA, many from the commercial farming 
sector felt that the whole process was delegitimized once they 
realized they, the largest water user, had only one seat, which 
may have colored their reflections on earlier processes.
Regarding the transformation of irrigation boards, DWA 
became increasingly prescriptive in adjusting representation 
requirements. The efforts and expense of the irrigation 
boards resulted in little influence on decisions—an exclusion 
acutely felt by those members who were expected to fund the 
WUAs’ and CMAs’ operations. The forestry sector felt simi-
larly aggrieved as it struggled for a CMA seat despite paying 
water use charges and attending CMA proposal meetings.
The Crocodile Forum was never about decision making 
but was more about improved management through better 
understanding, but “having no teeth” resulted in loss of inter-
est by the water service provider and Mbombela municipal-
ity. Similarly, the Forestry Liaison Forum saw interest 
decline once the major issues had been covered. With the 
Sappi EIA, legislation guaranteed response to concerns, and 
influence on decision making at a local level was a strong 
motivator to environmental groups.
Transparency. Procedural trust is more likely if a pro-
cess is transparent and independent of bias (Conley & 
Moote, 2003). The CMA process was initially transpar-
ent but became increasingly DWA Pretoria-led rather than 
user-led. The Advisory Committee was meant to be trans-
parent, neutral, and independent, but this was not the case. 
The facilitator led discussions in a particular direction, DWA 
Pretoria officials undoubtedly influenced proceedings, and 
DWA regional officials later complained they were silenced. 
The process increasingly became a “closed” space without 
observers, and the final selection of the governing board 
members was made without wider stakeholder consultation. 
Overall, the CMA process lost legitimacy because of the way 
it was conducted in the later stages when it was the Minister 
who decided which nominee would be given a seat on the 
CMA Governing Board.
The Crocodile Forum initiative was supported by DWA 
Regional officials who believed it had greater neutrality if it 
was not DWA-led. However, because there was a likely bias 
toward KNP interests, there was some resentment from the 
Department of Agriculture and Mpumalanga Parks Board 
officials. There were no complaints from environmental 
groups about the transparency of Golder Associates EIA 
Scoping Report (consultants hired by Sappi Kraft).
Accountable. The CMA Advisory Committee was not 
accountable to Inkomati stakeholders, many of whom were 
unknowns. Their recommendations were presented as a fait 
accompli without consultation, and the committee disbanded 
after its recommendations and so could not be held account-
able. Representation is unavoidable in large-scale initiatives 
such as the CMA, and success depends on two-way feed-
back: from the representative to community, and from the 
community back to the forums via their representative. Con-
tinuity of attendance is thus desirable. Feedback appears to 
be more of an issue with Black communities largely because 
of the scale of the Inkomati and access to the internet. Radio 
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appears to have potential from the experiences of the Upper 
Komati WUA. It is unreasonable to expect representatives to 
take responsibility without adequate compensation for dis-
seminating information and collecting feedback from a large 
and dispersed rural population.
Process criteria. An important practical consideration for par-
ticipatory processes is access to a range of resources that 
facilitate progress, and these are less subjective than “accep-
tance” criteria.
Accessible data and information. Not only is access to infor-
mation needed for discussion, it also needs to be meaning-
fully presented (Rowe & Frewer, 2000). There are issues in 
the case study area. Socio-economic data are collected at the 
provincial level, not co-terminous with the Inkomati Water 
Management Area, and are often out of date. In the Inkomati 
area, transparent and reliable water use data have always 
been a concern to Department Water Affairs. The irrigation 
boards are effective custodians of these data, and opacity 
has worked to their advantage and exacerbated knowledge 
asymmetries in the WUA transformation processes. This also 
hindered the CMA proposal process. The need to democra-
tize data has led DWA to make available via its website the 
most up to date figures on water availability and use that it 
has accrued. However, the digital divide means that not all 
stakeholders are able to access this information, and even 
then they may not understand the often technical language it 
is presented in.
Referring to the CMA Advisory Committee, some Black 
members lacked awareness of even the most basic geogra-
phy, and this had to be supplied in a rapid summary by the 
facilitator. This lack of knowledge slowed down the process 
for several months as it was realized that additional sessions 
would be required.
The Sappi Kraft case study indicated that when two “data-
wise” groups are on opposing sides of a conflict, data and 
science can be used to prove contradictory arguments, for 
instance, the water consumption of eucalyptus.
Human resources. As the CMA was an institutionalized 
process, ongoing capacity constraints within DWA (both in 
caliber, number, and motivation) and staff turnover (often 
the most experienced White officials move into the private 
consultancy sector) interrupt the support function in the par-
ticipatory processes. Following the reallocation of the CMA 
regional champion, support from the regional DWA office 
was not forthcoming, to the exasperation of DWA Pretoria. 
There was also concern that staff shortages at the Mpuma-
langa Environmental Department would slow down the 
Sappi EIA process.
Consultants were increasingly being used to undertake 
work for DWA, for example, the 1999 delineation of the 
Water Management Areas, to facilitate the Advisory 
Committee, to assist the CMA Governing Board in the 
drafting of a catchment management strategy, and in highly 
technical undertakings such as satellite verification of water 
use. Many of these processes were not participatory, which 
raises the issue of accountability and transparency.
Material resources. Visual aids are valuable for furthering 
understanding and were provided by the hotel venues used 
by the Crocodile Forum and the CMA Advisory Commit-
tee. This category needs to be broadened to include financial 
assistance with travel costs to attend meetings. The Komati 
irrigation board did provide travel expenses for Black attend-
ees, as did the CMA proposal processes. There are mixed 
feelings over this: There is a wariness of encouraging “career 
representatives” who come merely to collect money, and the 
KNP Water Manager felt that pre-payment would not guar-
antee attendance and input to the Crocodile Forum.
Adequate time. Where previously disadvantaged people 
are involved, adequate time is needed to make informed and 
considered recommendations, and avoid the label of a fait 
accompli. The irrigation boards illustrate this: The 6-month 
time frame of the 1998 Act to transform was unrealistic, 
especially as ever wider inclusion was required. Nkomazi 
municipal representatives, included later in the Komati irri-
gation board proposal process, understandably complained 
they were not given enough time to consider the WUA pro-
posal. The CMA proposal was the result of numerous meet-
ings from July 1997 to September 2000. In contrast, the CMA 
Advisory Committee was hastily convened and became a 
scramble to meet a political deadline: a CMA to be in place 
before the 2004 election.
Without consultation, decisions can be swift—for example, 
the 19 Water Management Areas were delineated in a month in 
1999. Deliberative processes can by their nature be protracted, 
but the government recognized there was potential for abuse 
that may harm the economy, as in the Sappi EIA delays. This 
is behind the drive to speed up the EIA processes.
Clear task and definition. There needs to be awareness of 
the purpose and plan of an initiative; otherwise, expectations 
may be unduly raised, time invested is wasted, and ultimately, 
there is a loss of interest. Once the Water Management Area 
was delineated, the CMA proposal process had clarity. The 
Sappi EIA and the CMA Advisory Committee had a distinct 
purpose. However, once the raison d’être disappears, for 
example, when the CMA Reference Group had submitted its 
proposal, the pattern is that members disengage. The scope 
of the irrigation board transformation process was less clear, 
and irrigation board representatives complained of lack of 
clarity from DWA Pretoria.
Products of participation. “Tangible” or “intangible” products 
should not be viewed as an end goal of participation, but as 
important components for Participatory Governance—itself 
a mid-term outcome of participatory processes.
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Tangible products. The 2000 Inkomati CMA proposal is an 
example of a “tangible” product, the result of a participatory 
process. The CMA that was nominally launched in March 
2004 and the Governing Board approved in September 2005 
constitute a new representative organization, but it was the 
work of the DWA-engineered representative Advisory Com-
mittee: It did not build on the original participatory CMA 
proposal process. The Sappi EIA process resulted in the pro-
duction of a Scoping Report that is in the public domain. All 
27 irrigation boards produced a WUA proposal—a product—
and all were rejected. It took the Elands Valley irrigation 
board 7 years and four attempts to get a proposal accepted.
Intangible products. It is important to stress that for some 
participatory initiatives, their objectives lie in the realm of 
intangible products. Improved relations and learning were 
the goals of the Crocodile and Forestry Liaison Forums. 
Through the Crocodile Forum, the KNP Water Manager 
succeeded in changing the perceptions of commercial farm-
ers about the KNP, hitherto seen as obstructive. Attendees 
were already well informed, but co-operation and under-
standing resulted. The forum was not successful in engaging 
Black representatives. The Forestry Liaison Forum did not 
achieve improved relations with environmentalists; rather, it 
strengthened opposition resulting in a coordinated assault on 
the Sappi Kraft expansion plan.
In the context of South Africa, any bringing together of 
previously segregated groups is to be applauded. The CMA 
proposal process did bring Black representation to the steer-
ing committees after separate homeland preparatory meet-
ings had taken place. At these meetings, breakaway smaller 
group discussions were more successful in building social 
trust than larger meetings.
Regarding irrigation boards, only the Elands Valley irri-
gation board chairman made a determined effort to engage 
with outside groups, not the irrigation board as a whole. 
Although the Upper Komati WUA proposal was accepted, its 
formation did not physically unite Black and White farmers. 
Rather, the champion met with the different groups in their 
own areas. The Black communities did speak but in their 
own language, and on their own ground. The White farmers, 
who were not previously organized into irrigation boards, 
came together, and that can be seen as progress. Other irriga-
tion boards have made no progress with improving relations 
and have even antagonized municipalities, as was the case 
with the Lomati and Komati irrigation boards in the lower 
Komati.
The Black representatives who attended the Komati and 
Lomati meetings have learnt something of the CMA process 
and some management issues, especially as the Komati irri-
gation board chairman ensured meetings were held in English 
and Siswati, and extra time was made available for educa-
tional purposes. However, relations between the racial 
groups in times of water stress became strained and partici-
pation has not created trust.
Processes, techniques, and their products/outputs are 
important. However, for many evaluators, this is where the 
evaluative effort draws to an end, and many of the intangible 
products touched on above are presented as evidence of sus-
tainable outcomes. However, they are not, and the objective 
of this evaluation is to look whether, through participatory 
governance, substantive sustainable outcomes in terms of 
conditions on the ground are being delivered in the Inkomati.
Participatory Governance Outcome Evaluation
There are organs of participatory governance in place in the 
Inkomati—the CMA and two WUAs—although whether 
they are the product of participatory processes is a moot 
point. The indicators from Table 2 are now applied to the 
vignettes.
Representatives are active in discussions and make substantive 
and meaningful contributions. Deliberation lies at the heart of 
the participatory paradigm, and ability to contribute is linked 
to capacity and social capital. Representation at meetings or 
organizations can be engineered, but mere presence does not 
guarantee substantive and meaningful contributions, that is, 
active participation (Wilson & Perret, 2010).
The CMA Governing Board was heavily weighted toward 
Black and environmental interests, which affects voting, but 
it cannot guarantee that there will be substantive inputs into 
how water in the Inkomati should be managed. The differ-
ence in education and experience of water management 
between the commercial farming representative and other 
members on the Inkomati Governing Board is evident from 
CVs of members, summarized in Brown (2011).
Discussions in March 2007 with a U.K. Environment 
Agency manager, who was leading a capacity-building proj-
ect with the Inkomati CMA Board, suggested that the Board 
was still in its infancy, and that capacity had to be built first. 
It can be inferred from this that the Board was still some way 
off planning and managing the water resources together. 
Reports indicate that by 2011, it was only nominally opera-
tional and was focusing on developing its management strat-
egy with the aid of consultants.
Turning to the two established WUAs, the DWA 
Mpumalanga Deputy Director for Water Resource 
Management, suggested (March 2005) that the establishment 
of WUAs was the easy part, and it is now that the “work 
starts.” This seems to mirror the CMA—that once estab-
lished they take considerable time to become fully opera-
tional. Experience from the Upper Komati WUA proposal 
process indicated that Black attendees at proposal meetings 
were active, but these were held in former homeland areas 
and in Siswati. How active will Black representatives be in 
meetings held in English at venues likely to be outside their 
locale? Observations of the multi-racial CMA Advisory 
Committee indicated that contributions from the Black rep-
resentatives, even the chairman, were minimal and even then 
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only at the direct prompting of the facilitator, and they 
appeared to just accede to the facilitator. There were substan-
tive contributions from resourced stakeholders in both the 
Sappi Kraft case study and the Crocodile Catchment Forum; 
however, the goal of the latter was improved relations, and 
the initiatives were not racially representative.
Discussion and negotiation leads to consensus over planning and 
managing of resources. To plan and manage the resource, 
there is a need through negotiation (which may oscillate 
between conflict and consensus) to reach a level of agree-
ment over possible options, and in a water-stressed area, 
such as the Inkomati, this will inevitably involve some con-
cessions. The CMA is still in its infancy, so it is not possible 
to know today what kind of negotiations are taking place. 
However, it could be a matter for concern that it is based on 
sectoral representation, which can “entrench difference and 
hinder cooperation” (Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998), 
so making concessions may be seen as failing one’s 
constituents.
Habermasian’s (1984) ideas that consensus will ultimately 
result from negotiations may not bear out in reality: It depends 
on the range of stakeholders involved. For example, the 
Komati irrigation board meetings are more a case of Black 
representatives ceding to commercial farmers because of 
technical complexity. Similarly, with the CMA Advisory 
Committee. Forsyth (2003) suggests “it seems reasonable to 
expect that different social groupings have different environ-
mental perceptions and framings” (p. 83). Stakeholders may 
hold diametrically opposing views on man–nature relations 
and how the environment should be managed: from an instru-
mental view on nature, often associated with industrialists, to 
an eco-centric environmentalist perspective. Thus, with two 
equally resourced sets of stakeholders, with radically differ-
ent views of nature, consensus may never result from discus-
sions because they share little common ground. The Sappi 
Kraft case study exemplifies this. It is not an example of par-
ticipatory governance but is an out-and-out conflict between 
industrialists trying to contain the EIA process and the coun-
ter-containing efforts of the environmentalists (Few, 2001).
The new representative organizations have the power to imple-
ment changes, and changes are made. What is of interest is the 
kinds of powers these new representative institutions have at 
their disposal to effect outcomes. Without powers, participa-
tory spaces are in danger of being seen as “talking shops” 
and lack legitimacy (Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998).
The reallocation of water-use licenses is one of the most 
important powers and functions of a CMA. The Inkomati 
was designated a compulsory licensing zone because it is so 
water stressed. This once-only responsibility has been ceded 
to DWA Pretoria because the CMA is still in its infancy: 
Thus, the most important power and tool for redress has been 
lost to the CMA.
The irrigation boards have actually enjoyed a high level 
of power in the day-to-day management of water at the micro 
level. Ironically, the 1998 Act is taking power away from the 
local level and vesting it at the Water Management Area level 
with the CMA. Of concern also was the ambiguous volun-
tary status of WUAs that may contravene one of Ostrom’s 
(1990) “design principles” for sustainable institutions: If the 
membership of institutions is not clearly defined or bounded, 
it is very difficult to impose sanctions.
Accountable. Representative organizations need to be held 
accountable to their constituents (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). 
The CMA Governing Board was not directly elected, but 
the Minister made the selections from nominations. They 
may therefore feel more accountable to government than the 
sector they represent. The desirable downward accountabil-
ity is likely to pose problems for the Potential Agricultural 
Water Use representative on the CMA Governing Board, 
because their constituents are not yet water users, and thus 
not organized around water nor are they members of WUAs. 
Accountability needs to be linked to practical considerations. 
When the potential users may come from a distant part of 
the catchment, several hours’ travel away and speak a differ-
ent African language, how is it practical to hold “surgeries?” 
These arrangements rely on the assumption that there is one 
Black population.
Sustainable Development Outcome Evaluation
Referring back to Figure 1, the CMA and WUA case studies 
indicate that progress has stalled at the stage of establishing 
representative organizations (products). These have taken a 
long time to establish, and even now, the CMA has no real 
powers to effect redress and achieve social sustainability. 
Thus, it is not possible to assess whether participatory initia-
tives will result in more sustainable outcomes. However, this 
should not deter attempts to put in place a framework for 
evaluation for a time when there are discernible changes.
The ultimate goal of the participatory initiative embodied 
in the 1998 Act was redress, and environmental protection 
as well as economic growth, so it seems reasonable to use 
these three pillars of sustainability as a framework against 
which to measure achievement. All three are needed for bal-
anced development (Baker, 2006). However, when the 
resource is in short supply, as it is in the Inkomati, and all 
three aspects of sustainability can make legitimate demands 
on it, tensions are inevitable. Redress in the Inkomati may 
only be achieved if water is reallocated away from the (rela-
tively) efficient commercial farming sector. In this context, 
the price of social sustainability could be the upset of eco-
nomic sustainability and goes some way to explain the pre-
varication of the government over redistribution. Similarly, 
the economy may suffer if the vocal environmentalists are 
allowed to derail industrial expansion. What these instances 
suggest is that there is a tendency in the South Africa 
Government to put economic sustainability first, which may 
ultimately reinforce inequalities in this already highly ineq-
uitable country.
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Any evaluation of progress is seriously hampered by an 
absence of baseline data—an oversight we have noted with 
the rolling out of participatory programs. It might be useful 
in South Africa to work on this forthwith, so there are statis-
tics available at the appropriate scale for when outcomes 
start to show. Too many indicators becomes unwieldy and 
impractical to collect and analyze (Bell & Morse, 1999), and 
given the human resources situation in South Africa, this also 
needs to be borne in mind.
Key Findings of the Evaluative Framework
The strength of the evaluative framework is that it allowed 
for careful and methodical analysis of four different partici-
patory initiatives in South Africa and for general conclusions 
to be drawn. The framework assists in answering the follow-
ing important question: If the rationale is that top-down mod-
els failed, what is the evidence that participatory efforts will 
result in more sustainable outcomes in South Africa? The 
framework also importantly clarifies the distinction between 
processes, products, and outcomes that has often become 
blurred in the literature, and thus allows researchers, practi-
tioners, and decision makers to track progress toward the 
ultimate goal of the initiative.
Time emerges as an important factor from the vignettes 
presented. The CMA and WUA case studies illustrate how 
long it takes to establish representative organs of governance. 
Indeed, the analysis demonstrates that progress has stalled at 
the stage of establishing new representative institutions (the 
product of participatory processes). The rural Black popula-
tion has yet to see any meaningful change, and it is unlikely 
the CMA will be in a position to effect redistribution in the 
near future. The CMA vignette suggests that decisions are 
more expedient when they are not participatory—for exam-
ple, the original (1999) delineation of the 19 Water 
Management Areas by consultants. The argument is that they 
are not transparent, but neither was the supposedly participa-
tory Inkomati Advisory Committee, as the CMA vignette 
demonstrated. The Sappi Kraft vignette also suggests that 
participatory efforts considerably slow down decision mak-
ing, which could have an impact on the economy. Moreover, 
participatory efforts have the potential to give undue power 
to a vocal minority at the expense of the majority and are 
open to manipulation. In the case of the CMA vignette, the 
interventions by DWA Pretoria officials to stave off elite cap-
ture of the CMA process, the ceding of Black representatives 
to more vocal White participants in heterogeneous meetings, 
and the dependence on White NGO representation, all under-
line the need for a reduction in knowledge and power asym-
metries before meaningful participation can take place. 
However, given the legacy of educational disparities and 
petty discrimination resulting from apartheid policies, this 
rebalancing may take one or two generations to accomplish. 
Is this realistic or even fair given South Africa’s history? 
Williams (2004) suggests we now need to ask ourselves 
“what longer term political value do participatory processes 
have for the poor?” (p. 568).
Leadership emerges from the analysis as being hugely 
important: Individuals with particular personal qualities are 
behind the CMA proposal process, the two approved WUA pro-
posals, and the Crocodile Forum. It may not accord with notions 
of community action, but remove it, and initiatives flounder.
The need to evaluate both processes and outcomes is clear, 
but Conley and Moote (2003) are right that it is a “daunting 
task” (p. 374), and as one moves from processes toward out-
comes, the difficulties intensify. The vignettes also demon-
strate the real difficulty of measuring the outcomes of 
participatory efforts, which also partly explains the dearth of 
process- and outcome-orientated evaluations. A constraint 
of the framework has been the dearth of baseline data col-
lected prior to the initiation of participatory efforts, which 
does compromise evaluations. This is in part due to the 
unwavering faith in the power of participation to yield results.
Ultimately, the evaluative framework (Figure 1) reminds 
us that sustainable outcomes and not stages along the way 
are the ultimate goal of the many participatory efforts, and 
thus the measure of their success. When applied to the CMA 
and WUA case studies, the evaluative framework demon-
strates that the initiatives have not progressed in a linear 
fashion from process criteria to sustainable outcomes: 
Rather, their journey has been iterative, coming to a halt with 
participatory governance institutions, then turning back to 
try to perfect approaches, particularly representation. Those 
practitioners with a dogged faith that participation will 
deliver in the end see “‘getting the techniques right’ [as] the 
principal way of ensuring the success of such approaches” 
(Glicken, 2000, p. 36, Cleaver, 2001). This is clearly exem-
plified with the action of DWA Pretoria in both the establish-
ment of the CMA and approval of WUA proposals. It is thus 
unsurprising that many researchers have also focused on pro-
cess evaluations because as this study illustrates, they are 
easier to undertake. Perfecting participatory processes lies in 
the realms of the possible, and as Medawar (1967) reminds 
us “[i]f politics is the art of the possible, research is surely the 
art of the soluble. Both are immensely practical-minded 
affairs” (p. 7). Sustainability outcome evaluations take us 
into uncomfortable and uncharted territory. Nonetheless, it is 
hoped that the evaluative framework and the lack of sustain-
able outcomes they lay bare may force decision makers to 
acknowledge that the participatory experiment is flawed and 
instead to consider policies that can yield redress and sus-
tainable management in a more expedient fashion.
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